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the following companies of my command were moved to the front for the defense of the citizens of Nebraska:
   Company A, commanded by Capt. F. F. Osborne, and Company G, commanded by Capt. George C. Clark, of the First Infantry, to Rushville; Company E, commanded by Capt. E. D. Percy, First Infantry, to Chadron; Company K, commanded by Capt. E. Hansen, First Infantry, and Company B, commanded by Capt. S. H. Webster, Second Infantry, to Crawford; Company H, commanded by Capt. Charles F. Beek, Second Infantry, to Gordon. Major Williams and Sergeant Dempster, of the First Infantry, moved with the companies too Rushville, and Quartermaster Wilson of the Second Infantry, moved to Gordon. Company E, commanded by Capt. T. J. Smith, of the Second Infantry, stationed at Chadron, Company F, commanded by Capt, M. Finch, of the Second Infantry, at Hay Springs, and Company K, commanded by Capt. U. P. Dagman, Second Infantry, at Long Pine, were placed on duty at once.
   On January 4th, I received general orders from the Governor of Nebraska to move my entire command, or so much thereof as might be available, to the northwestern part of the state for the defense of the citizens, and in accordance therewith, all brigade-staff officers: were ordered to report at once, and the several Infantry Companies of the First and Second Regiments were moved from their several company stations by first regular trains, as follows:
   First Regiment: Company B, commanded by Capt. A. Klein Schmidt, and Company F, commanded by Capt. L. A. Ballou, to Crawford; Company C, commanded by Capt. A. A. Reed, to Valentine; Company H, commanded by Capt. H. W. Short, to Rushville, and Company I, commanded by G. R. Wilson, to Cody.
   Second Regiment: Company C, commanded by Capt. Charles E. Harris, to Gordon; Company D, commanded by Capt. John Heasty, to Harrison; Company I, commanded by Capt. Chas. C. Eroe, to Crawford, and Company 4, commanded by Capt. C. F. Ingalls, to Hay Springs..
   Company D, commanded by Capt. W. C. Rohde, of the First Infantry, and Company A, commanded by Capt. Hefner, of the Second Infantry, Captain Murdock's Battery, and Captain Culver's Troop of Cavalry were held as reserves at their several company stations.
   Regimental commanders, with their field and staff, were ordered,

to move with their commands and report to brigade headquarters, which were at once established at Rushville, at which point I arrived on January 5th.
   I found the situation in Nebraska at this time, critical. The people were very much excited both in and out of the towns, extending over the country for about one hundred and fifty miles east and west, and more than fifty miles south, of the reservation. Hundreds of settlers had left their farms and gathered into the towns, leaving their stock unprovided for, and in many instances starving. At Chadron there were over one hundred and thirty families gathered in from the out-lying country and dependent upon the public for shelter and food; and this same condition existed in a more or less degree all along the line of the F. E. & M. V. R. R. from Harrison to Valentine. Officers were immediately sent to each of the towns between and including the points named, with instructions to examine and report the facts to brigade headquarters. The commanders of companies stationed at Valentine, Cody, Gordon, Rushville, Hay Springs, Chadron, Crawford and Harrison were also instructed to report at once the actual condition of things at their respective stations, including apparent danger, causes of alarm and the necessity for troops.
   Col. W. F. Cody, Aid-de-Camp upon Governor Thayer's staff, reported to me at brigade headquarters for special duty by order of the Governor, and was dispatched to Pine Ridge Agency, which is about twenty-six miles north of Rushville, and but two miles north of the Nebraska line, to learn and report the location of the hostile Indians and the main points of danger to Nebraska citizens. William Vlandry, a half breed Indian, was employed as general scout and guide, and was dispatched with other scouts to gain such information as was possible from the Indians.
   Upon receiving reports from these sources, it was determined that the country actually in danger and more liable to suffer devastation, in case of a general Indian uprising, was that district lying nearly directly south of the Indian Reservation, between White River on the west, and the Sand Hills on the east, extending from Chadron to a few miles beyond Gordon, a distance of some forty or fifty miles.
   Having established the Quartermaster, Commissary and Medical de-
   12

partments, with a basis of supplies at Rushville, and believing that confidence would be restored, and the people be better protected by placing the state troops under my command between the settlements and the hostile Indians, I determined upon establishing a line of fortified posts, or camps, north of the railroad stations, from eight to twenty miles, and between the outlying ranches and the reservation, with a reserve force at each of the important towns in that section.
   In pursuance of this plan two companies were at once moved about ten miles north of Gordon, two companies twelve miles north of Rushville, and two companies to the crossing at White River about ten miles north of Chadron, with orders to establish posts, fortify by earthworks, trenches and rifle pits, establish camp guards, picket lines, out-posts and vidette stations.
   For the purpose of establishing and keeping up communications between each of these posts and the railroad stations, a system of mounted citizen couriers, who were employed on the credit of the State from among the resident citizens, was established. This disposition of the troops was accomplished promptly and without accident, although their movements were somewhat impeded by a snow storm and by the weather's becoming colder.
   For the purpose of completing the line of fortified posts and making them more effective as protection to the citizens, on the following day, the companies stationed at Valentine, Cody, Crawford and Harrison were ordered into the field of actual danger in front of the Reservation, and six new posts were established on the general line of the others, each to be in communication with the others as well as with the reserves herd at the several railroad stations. The completion of these movements made a continuous line of fortified camps between the outlying ranches and the hostile Indians. Col. C. J. Bills of the Second Infantry, was placed in command of the troops upon the right; and Col. J. P. Bratt of the First Infantry, was placed in command of the troops upon the left of the line.
   Each company was provided with five days' rations, with tents, sheet iron stoves, axes, spades and shovels, and the posts were established at places convenient to wood and water. Each camp was fortified by earthworks, rifle pits and trenches, and the posts were generally located so as to command a view of the valleys for several

miles, and could have been defended successfully against a largely superior attacking force.
   The several companies of my command were posted substantially as follows:
   Company I, First Regiment, at Chadron. Companies E and F, First Regiment, near Madden's bridge, at the crossing of White River, near the month of the Big Bordeaux Creek. Company C, First Regiment, at Stryker's ranch, about fourteen miles northeast of Chadron, near Beaver Creek, about three miles from old Fort Sheridan. Company K, First Regiment, at Swallow's ranch, on Beaver Creek, about two miles from the Post Office of Adaton, near the former sight of the Spotted Tail Agency. Company G, Second Regiment at Hay Springs. Companies E and F, Second Regiment, about ten miles north of Hay Springs, at a point below Cheney's ranch, on Beaver Creek. Company G, First Regiment, at Rogers' Mill, about sixteen miles northwest from Rushville, at the head waters of a branch of White Clay Creek, which flows northward through the Pine Ridge Reservation into White River, some miles beyond. Company D, of the Second, and Company B, of the First Regiment, at Rushville. Companies A and H, First Regiment, at Jarcho's ranch, about twelve miles northward from Rushville on the main road to the Pine Ridge Agency. Company B, Second Regiment, at Morey's ranch, about sixteen miles from Rushville, at the forks of Larabee Creek, which flows northward into White Clay Creek. Company K, Second Regiment, at Gordon. Company C, Second Regiment, about ten miles north of Gordon, at Collins' ranch, on the head waters of Antelope Creek, which flows southward into the Niobrara River. Companies H and I, Second Regiment, near the Post Office at Albany, about fourteen miles northwest from Gordon on Wounded Knee Creek, which flows northwest into the White River, on the Reservation.
   On January 5th, a large number of the hitherto friendly Indians encamped south of the Agency, on that portion of the Reservation which extends about ten miles down into Nebraska, attempted to move to the northwest and join the hostiles in the Bad Lands; but their course was intercepted, and they returned to camp with no serious trouble. Red Cloud at this time sent a message into the Agency claiming that be was a prisoner, and begging the soldiers to

come and save him from the other Indians, who were determined to drag him into the war.
   Wounded Knee Creek was the scene of another conflict on January 5th. A detachment of thirty men was sent out from the Agency to protect a number of wagons with supplies that were known to be coming on the road. When the detachment had gone about ten miles they discovered the thirteen wagons drawn up in the form of a square, resisting an attack made by a band of about fifty Indians. At the approach of the troops, who came upon a full gallop, the Indians retreated behind the bluffs and bills, but soon returned and renewed the attack, circling around the wagons at a distance of about eight hundred yards. The troops joined their forces to the teamsters who numbered only nineteen men, made breastworks of sacks of grain, bundles and boxes, and fired upon the circling Indians. The shots from the Winchesters of the Indians fell short and did little damage, although the carbines of the troops were effective in bringing down a number of Indians with their horses. The firing was continued for some time, the number of Indians increasing until there were over 1.00 warriors in all. A soldier was selected to return to camp, report the situation and obtain assistance; and by being mounted on a fast horse, he was able to get, the start and make his escape, although chased by twenty or more Indians, who fired shot after shot at him. One soldier was shot in the shoulder. Four cavalry horses were shot and killed. As the firing continued, three more Indians were seen to fall from their horses, and were at once picked up and carried away by their comrades. A large number of Indian ponies was disabled. While the main body of Indians was engaging the soldiers and teamsters, a few Indians crept up quite near and began firing into the horses, trying to stampede them, but were repulsed by the fire being turned upon them before their object was accomplished. The firing continued for some three hours, and until about two o'clock in the afternoon, when the reinforcements were seen coming down the road, charging at a gallop, and the Indians scattered in all directions retreating to the bluffs and canyons. Troop F, that had come to the rescue, pursued the Indians until darkness made it prudent to return, and succeeded in capturing some ponies and in killing some eight Indians. The wagon train and troops returned to the camp that night without further accident.

   On January 7th, a small band of about twenty Indians was reported to have escaped from the Agency, to have crossed White River toward the southwest, and to be moving in the direction of Montrose, in Sioux county, toward the Black Hills. This report was found, however, to be based upon the return of some friendly Indians from a hunting expedition. On this day, also, a deplorable tragedy occurred in the death of Lieutenant Casey, of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry. He went from General Brooke's camp to visit a small band of Ogallalas, who were butchering cattle, and appeared to be friendly. After a short interview with them, he started to go a little farther in order to reach the top of a hill and obtain a view of the hostile camp. While he was talking with Peter Richards, a son-in-law of Red Cloud, he was shot by an Indian named Plenty Horses and fell from his horse dead. Lieutenant Casey had been in command of a troop of Cheyenne scouts for about a year, and had taken great pride in his work.
   On January 8th, the Secretary of the Interior removed Mr. Royer from the Agency at Pine Ridge and placed Captain Pierce, of the First U. S. Infantry, in charge. The Pine Ridge, Rosebud, Standing Rook, Cheyenne River and Tongue River Reservations were also placed under the control of the military, with General Miles in command.
   On complaint being made to General Schofield, at Washington, that the matter of the fight on Wounded Knee Creek should be investigated, it was suggested to General Miles that Colonel Forsythe be relieved of his command, pending such investigation, and the same was done and an investigation ordered.
   On January 9th, the report came that a small band of Indians had engaged and been repulsed by a Troop of Regulars, near the mouth of White Clay Creek. In the evening, a big powwow in the hostile camp was held, at which Young-Man-Afraid-Of-His-Horses was present as a representative of the friendly Indians. Many of the Ogallalas, led by Little Wound and Big Road, urged their return and surrender, and after much wrangling and fighting, it was finally agreed that they should move their camp up White Clay Creek to within about five miles from the Agency, near the Catholic Mission.
   By this time, the ranchmen and settlers in the country adjacent to the Reservation recovered from their panic, and business was resumed

in the outlying towns and cities. The establishment of the Nebraska National Guard at the posts indicated, and the general good conduct and discipline of the troops, very soon restored the confidence of the people; and within a few days thereafter all excitement was allayed and the settlers returned to their ranches and homes.
   On January 11th, for the convenience of Regimental Commanders, and for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of my command in the field, the several companies of National Guard were formed into the following battalions or divisions:
   1. The Chadron Division, consisting of Company I, First Regiment, at Chadron; Companies E and F, First Regiment, at Madden's bridge on White River; Company C, First Regiment, at Stryker's ranch, and Company K, First Regiment, at Swallows' ranch, on Beaver Creek. This Division was placed under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel W. W. Wolcott, of the First Infantry.
   2. The Hay Springs Division, consisting of Company G, Second Regiment, at flay Springs; Companies E and F, Second Regiment, stationed near Cheney's ranch. This Division was placed under the immediate command of Major W. J. Courtright, of the Second Infantry.
   3. The Rushville Division, consisting of Companies A and H of the First Regiment, stationed at Jarcho's ranch, and such other troops as should be assigned to such Division from time to time. This Division was placed under the immediate command of Major T. L. Williams of the First Infantry.
   4. The Gordon Division, consisting of Company K, Second Regiment, at Gordon; Company C, Second Regiment, at Collins' ranch, and Companies I and K, Second Regiment, stationed on Wounded Knee Creek, near Albany. This Division was placed under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Bischoff, of the Second Infantry.
   5. Company B, of the Second Regiment, stationed at Morey's Ranch, and Company D, Second Regiment, stationed at Rushville, reported direct to Colonel C. J. Bills, commanding Second Infantry, with headquarters at Rushville, and having general supervision of the posts upon the right of the line.
   6. Company G, First Regiment, stationed at Roger's mill, and Company B, First Regiment, stationed at Rushville, reported direct

to Colonel J. P. Bratt, commanding First Infantry, with headquarters at Rushville, and having general supervision of the posts upon the left of the line.
   On the morning of January 11th, it was discovered that a large portion of the hostile Indians had moved in nearer the Agency, in accordance with the resolutions of their powwow held on the 9th. Little Wound, Big Road, Two Strike, Kicking Bear, Short Bull and other chiefs, with their hostile bands were encamped on White Clay, about five miles northward from Pine Ridge Agency.
   On January 12th, the main hostile camp of Indians moved still nearer to the Agency and was located about three miles to the north, in the wide valley of the creek, and almost in sight and within easy range of the guns planted on the hill a half mile north. The Indians came with their wives, families, ponies and baggage of every kind; and in the afternoon sent in reliable messengers, stating that they did not want war, but wanted their difficulties and wrongs settled in peace. Late in the evening, I received the following message from General Miles:

   "PINE RIDGE, S. D., Jan. 12, 1891.      

GEN. L. W. COLBY, Rushville, Neb.
   I am glad to inform you that the entire body of Indians are now encamped near here within a mile and a half. They show every disposition to comply with orders of the authorities; nothing but an accident can prevent peace being re-established; and it will be our ambition to make it of a permanent character. I feel that the State Troops can new be withdrawn with safety, and desire through you to express to them my thanks for the confidence they have given your people in their isolated homes.

   NELSON A. MILES,     
   Maj. Gen. Commanding."     

   After wiring the Adjutant General of Nebraska the contents of said message, I immediately sent the following reply to General Miles:

   "RUSHVILLE, NEB., Jan. 12, 1891.      

GEN. NELSON A. MILES, Pine Ridge, S. D.
   I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram this evening, informing me of the prospect of the immediate re-establishment of peace with the Indians at Pine Ridge Agency. I trust that no accident will intervene to prevent such a desired consummation.

   I assure you that the compliment expressed in your message for the State Troops under my command will be appreciated and highly esteemed by the citizen soldiers of Nebraska. I have wired the Adjutant General the contents of your message, and will hold my command in its present position till I learn that peace is an accomplished fact.

L. W. COLBY,     
Brigadier General Commanding."     

   Early on the morning of January 13th, the following message was received from the Adjutant General of Nebraska:

"LINCOLN, NEB.; Jan. 13, 1891.      

GEN. L. W. COLBY, Rushville, Neb.
   Your command will remain at the front until the lives and property of citizens are perfectly secured. Be more vigilant than ever. Advise me daily. You will withdraw your command when everything is safe, not before.

VICTOR VIFQUAIN,     
 Adjutant General."     

   At about noon, I received information through an aid-de-camp that the hostile Indians had partially surrendered, and that quite a number of them had come into the Agency; although the main camp was still out about two miles. They were now right under the guns placed at the north of the Agency, and the Regular Troops were moved in from the right and left in their rear, while a large force still remained in their front. During the day a number of men and squaws came from the hostile camp on horseback and in wagons, being relieved of their arms by the guards before passing the Outposts. When they returned to the hostile camp, these arms were returned to, the owners.
   Colonel Wheaton was posted about eight miles west of the Agency with Companies B, D, E and F of the Second. Colonel Henry with his four troops of the Ninth Cavalry, was ordered to White Clay Creek to follow General Brooke, whose headquarters were established with Colonel Sanford's command, who had moved up to within about four miles of the Indians. Colonel Sanford's command consisted of one troop each of the First, Second and Ninth Cavalry, and Companies A, C, G and H, of the Second Infantry, and the Cheyenne Scouts, formerly commanded by the late Lieutenant Casey, but now in charge of Lieutenant Getty.
   The Indians did not come in as expected. They seemed to be in

doubt as to the proper course to take. They were afraid of punishment, of bad faith, and wished to have a meeting and some kind of an agreement. Lieutenant Taylor of the Ninth Cavalry, with a couple of scouts, was sent out to talk with them and give them assurances, and also to guide them to a place for camping at the Agency; but the Indians showed no disposition to move in farther. They were acting in perfect good faith, but their experiences had made them suspicious. At this time they were surrounded by troops, and although their camp was guarded, and military discipline was observed, yet their position was not advantageous either for assault or defense. Major Whiteside, in command of the Seventh Cavalry was ready to move at a moment's notice. Colonel Shaftner of the First Infantry, had about three hundred of his men mounted and prepared for immediate action. Captain Capron's battery and Gatling guns were in position ready for action. Light works had been thrown up on the bluffs north of the Agency, and were guarded by artillery and Hotchkiss guns, supported by Companies B and H of the First Infantry, under command of Captain Dougherty.
   Young-Man-Afraid-Of-His-Horses came in from the hostile camp and arranged with General Miles for a meeting of the hostile Chiefs. Little Wound, Little Hawk, Crow Dog, and others to be held on January 14th, and at this council, which was held as agreed upon, satisfactory arrangements were made for the surrender of their arms and the moving of the hostile camp to the Agency.
   At about noon of January 14th, I received a message from Pine Ridge Agency, asking if the troops of my command could be held until something more definite could be ascertained in regard to the intentions of the hostile Indians; and I at once wired information that the same could be held, and immediately instructed Major C. O. Bates, my Assistant Adjutant General, to have Regimental Commanders hold their companies until further orders, after which I proceeded to Pine Ridge Agency, where I arrived about three o'clock in the afternoon. Upon personal consultation with General Miles, I learned that the hostile Indians had absolutely surrendered, and that confidence had been established, so that there was no reasonable apprehension of further danger.
   On the morning of January 15th, the hostile bands made early preparations to come into the Agency, and by noon a general move-

ment was under way. They decided to pitch their camp on the west side of White Clay Creek, and by evening the smoky, yellow cones of seven hundred and forty-two lodges were placed in plain view of the Agency buildings to the west, extending along the creek bottom for about a mile, and General Brooke was ordered to march in with his command from the camp below the Mission.
   Chief Big Road reported that he had been engaged in the collection of the arms of his followers, and brought in nine guns, which he turned over to the authorities.
   General Miles had another consultation with the Indians in regard to the treatment which they were to receive, and the contracts and treaties which the Indians claimed had been violated. There were present, Little Wound, Two Strike, Big Road, Crow Dog, Kicking Bear, Eagle Pipe and other chiefs, who showed a very friendly disposition, and expressed great confidence in General Miles. The General was pleased with their disposition and guaranteed that in the future the government would carry out its contracts and treaties. He assured the chiefs that they should be treated fairly and honorably, and that their rights should be guarded. The best of feeling seemed to be manifested, and General Miles at once had the Quartermaster issue rations of beef, coffee and sugar, and sent the same to the hostile camp.
   This was the end of the Sioux Indian war of 1890-'91. The Nebraska National Guard, under my command, were at once returned to their homes by the first regular trains, the order therefor being telegraphed by me from Pine Ridge Agency; and the Troops of the Regular Army were returned to their former posts and stations as rapidly as the railroad facilities would permit, only a few companies being retained at the Agency.
   This Indian war might be regarded as the result of a misconception or a misunderstanding of the Indian character, and of the real situation and condition of things on the Reservations; and the terrible and needless slaughter was the result of a mistake. The general condition of things, however, which made such misunderstanding and mistake possible was the result of the Indian policy of the Government.
   A brief review of the rights of the Sioux tribe or Nation might not be considered inappropriate in this paper.
   In 1876, the United States made a treaty with the Sioux Nation

by which the Indians surrendered all right and title to the region known as the Black Hills. The United States in lieu of such cession agreed to provide all necessary assistance to them in the work of civilization, to furnish schools for their children, and instruction in mechanical and agricultural arts as provided for in the former treaty of 1868.
   "Also to provide the said Indians with subsistence consisting of a ration for each individual of a pound and a half of beef (net), or in lieu thereof one-half pound of bacon; one-half pound of flour; and one-half pound of corn; and for every one hundred rations four pounds of coffee; eight pounds of sugar and three pounds of beans, or in lieu of said articles, the equivalent thereof, in the discretion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Such rations, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall be continued until the Indians are able to support themselves."
   There were at that time about 30,000 persons in the Sioux Nation. The ration promised was substantially the army ration and at the estimated cost of 28 cents each the total rations would amount to $8,400 per day, or $3,066,000 per year.
   The treaty of 1876 continued in force all provisions of the former treaty of 1868, not in conflict therewith, or expressly annulled thereby. Therefore in addition to rations they were entitled to clothing and various other expenditures. This treaty was made by a commission, composed of the following men: Hon. G. W. Manypenny, Bishop H. B. Whipple, Dr. J. W. Daniels, Hon. A. G. Boone, Ex-Governor Newton Edmonds, H. C. Bulis and A. S. Gaylord. The treaty was signed on the part of the Sioux Nation by the head Chief Mah-Pea-Lu-Pah, Red Cloud, and over 400 tribal chiefs, subchiefs and head men.
   Art. 4 of this treaty has the following:
   "The Government of the United States and the said Indians being mutually desirous that the latter should be located in a country where they may eventually become self supporting and acquire the arts of a civilized life, it is agreed that the said Indians shall select a delegation of five or more chiefs from each band, who shall without delay visit the Indian Territory with a view to selecting therein a permanent home for the said Indians. If such delegations shall make selections satisfactory to themselves, the people they represent, and

the United States, the Indians agree that they will move to the country so selected within one year from this date."
   The chairman of this Commission subsequently published the following statement in regard to this matter:
   "By their instructions the Sioux Commission was informed that the President was strongly impressed with the belief that the agreement which shall be best calculated to enable the Indians to become self-supporting, is one which shall provide for their removal to the Indian Territory. Their main dependence for support must ultimately be the cultivation of the soil, and for this purpose their own country is utterly unsuited."
   Under the guidance of Government officers appointed for that purpose, a delegation of Indians visited the Indian Territory and had a public reception at Okmulgee, the capital of the Creek Nation. The Chief of the Creek Nation made an address of welcome to the delegation in which he used the following language:
   "We believe our right to our soil and our Government, which is best suited to our peculiar necessities, would be safer if all our race were united together here. That is my earnest wish. Then I think the rising generation could be educated and civilized, and what is still better, Christianized. This would be to our mutual benefit and good. I know I express the minds of our people when I give you this welcome to a life of higher civilization."
   President Grant had specially recommended the removal clause in the treaty which, however, was rejected by Congress supported by the military.
   By the terms of the treaty an annual appropriation for provisions alone required over $3,000,000. By an examination of the appropriation acts it appears that the total appropriation for the year 1888, for the six tribes of the Sioux Nation and the Santee tribe of Nebraska, for subsistence, clothing, schools, pay of employees and all other expenses pertaining to the support and civilization of these Indians was only $1,318,500; for the year 1889 only $1,168,500, and in 1890 only $1,263,500.
   General Nelson A. Miles, on December 19th, 1890, sent a telegraphic dispatch from Rapid City, South Dakota, to General Schofield, at Washington, D. C., in which he used the following language:
   "The difficult Indian problem cannot be solved permanently at this

end of the line. It requires the fulfillment by Congress of the treaty obligations which the Indians were entreated and coerced into signing. They signed away a valuable portion of their reservation, and it is now occupied by white people, for which they have received nothing. They understood that ample provision would be made for their support; instead, their supplies have been reduced, and much of the time they have been living on half and two-thirds rations. Their crops, as well as the crops of the white people, for two years have been almost total failures. The dissatisfaction is wide spread, especially among the Sioux, while the Cheyennes have been on the verge of starvation, and were forced to commit depredations to sustain life. These facts are beyond question, and the evidence is positive and sustained by thousands of witnesses.
   The trouble has been gathering for years. Congress has been in session now for several weeks, and could in a single hour confirm the treaty and appropriate the funds for its fulfillment; and, unless the officers of the army can give positive assurance that the Government intends to act in good faith with these people, the. loyal element will be diminished, and the hostile element increased."
   The Honorable Commissioner of Indian Affairs in a letter to the Secretary of the Interior, dated December 26, 1890, has the following statement:
   "I desire to ask your attention briefly to the situation as viewed from the Indian standpoint.
   Prior to the agreement of 1876, buffalo and deer were the main support of the Sioux. Food, tents and bedding were the direct outcome of hunting. And with furs and pelts as articles of barter, or exchange, it was easy for the Sioux to procure whatever constituted for them the necessities, the comforts, or even the luxuries of life. Within eight years from the agreement of 1876 the buffalo had gone, and the Sioux had left to them alkali land and Government rations.
   It is hard to over-state the magnitude of the calamity, as they viewed it, which happened to these people by the sudden disappearance of the buffalo, and the large diminution in the number of deer and other wild animals. It was as if a blight had fallen upon all our grain fields, orchards and gardens, and a plague upon all our sheep and cattle. Their loss was so overwhelming, and the change of life which it necessitated so great, that the wonder is that they endured

it as well as they did. For not only did the vast herds of buffalo, and exhaustless supply of deer and other animals, furnish them with food, clothing, shelter, furniture and articles of commerce, but the pursuit of these animals and the preparation of their products furnished to the great body of them continuous employment and exciting diversion. Suddenly, almost without warning, all this was changed, and they were all expected at once and without previous training to settle down to the pursuits of agriculture in a land largely unfitted for use. The freedom of the chase was to be exchanged for the idleness of the camp. The boundless range was to be abandoned for the circumscribed reservation; and abundance of plenty to be supplanted by limited and decreasing Government subsistence and supplies. Tinder these circumstances it is not in human nature not to be discontented and restless, even turbulent and violent."
   The Commissioner of Indian Affairs in a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Interior dated January 5, 1891, estimates the number of Sioux at 22,324, and shows, that the whole amount of beef furnished to them for the year ending June 30, 1890, was only 15,331,611 lbs., and of flour 2,899,583 lbs. This would give only about 9-10 lbs. of beef gross, and 36-100 of a pound of flour, per day, while the ration stipulated in the agreement was to be 3 lbs. of beef gross, and 1/2 lb. of flour, per day, besides sugar, coffee, corn, beans, etc. The Commissioner in the same letter says: "The failure to fulfill speedily all the promises made to them by the Sioux Commissioners, especially the restoration of the rations diminished by act of Congress, as a condition of securing the signatures of the majority, discouraged those who signed, and gave some reason for the taunts and reproaches heaped upon them by the non-progressive party."
   When the Sioux delegation was in Washington, in February, 1891, shortly after the hostilities were over, the Indian Chief, Two Strike, who was considered as the real leader of the hostiles, made a statement as to the cause of the trouble, substantially as follows:
   "We have been suffering for food and other things, which the Government promised to give us for our lands which we sold in 1868 and 1876; and we were disappointed at not getting pay for the land we sold to the Government last summer. We had come to fear that the Government would let our wives and children starve, for rations were getting less and less all the time. Last spring we heard of a

great Medicine Man out in the far West who had been sent from the Great Spirit to help the Indians. From what we could learn of him he was like the white man's Christ. We sent one of our men out to Montana to see this new Messiah. He came back and told us that it was all true what we had beard; and that he had seen the new Messiah and talked with him, and he said that he had come to restore the Indians to their former state. Some of us believed this good news, and we began to hold meetings. These meetings are what the white people call "Ghost Dances." We pray to the Great Spirit, and dance around a pole, or post, while we pray. We did not think we were doing any harm by dancing our religious dances, and praying to the Great Spirit to send the Deliverer to us quickly. We had no thought of going on the war path against the Government or our white neighbors. One day a white man employed at a trader's store at the Agency came up to my camp and told me that the soldiers were coming to stop the dance. This scared us so that we put our women and children into wagons and got on our ponies and left our homes. We went to Pine Ridge and asked Red Cloud and his people to let us have a home on their reservation. They said we might stay, but in a short time we heard that the Agent at Pine Ridge had sent for soldiers to come and make us stop dancing. Then we went to the Bad Lands and some of the Ogallalas who had joined our dance went with us. We went there to keep away from the soldiers. We did not want to fight, we only wanted to be let alone, and to be allowed to worship the Great Spirit in our own way. We did not go off the reservation, nor rob any white man of his property. We did take some cattle on the reservation which we knew belonged to the Indians, for they bad been bought by the Government with the Indians' money. We did not mean to fight unless the soldiers came to the Bad Lands to break up our dance and take our guns away from us. If the soldiers bad not come to our country there would have been no trouble between us and the Government."
   I have attached to this paper, in the nature of an appendix some interviews with the leading chiefs, and with others in a position to know and understand the real condition of things, and also letters from Dr. McGillycuddy, for many years an Agent at Pine Ridge, and from Miss Sickels, a lady who established the first Indian school at that reservation.

   The whole difficulty might be summarized as the fault of the ills, resulting from a non-performance of the treaty stipulations on the part of our Government during the past thirteen years. The Sioux Nation as such, was not really on the war path during any of this time. A portion of them was justly excited at the assassination of their famous old Medicine Man, his children and followers on the Grand River. And their animosity was provoked by the useless massacre of Big Foot and his heroic band on the banks of Wounded Knee. But the vengeance of the Sioux Nation was never directed to the white settlers adjoining the reservations in Dakota, Wyoming and Nebraska. There were no blazing cabins, no desolated settlements, no fields crimson with the blood of frontiersmen. Not a Single settler was killed, nor a white man's home disturbed during the whole trouble. The assassination of Sitting Bull, his sons and others of his band, and the massacre of Big Foot and the two hundred or more partially armed warriors and defenseless women and children, are the dark and bloody tragedies resulting from the grievous errors of the men charged with the administration of the Government, and will forever stain the soil of America, and add to the infamy of the dark spots on the record of our republic in its dealings with the Spartan race of the Western Continent.
   Letter from Dr. V. T. M'Gillycuddy, formerly Indian Agent in Charge at Pine Ridge:

   "PINE RIDGE, S. D., Jan. 15, 1891.     

   "GEN. L. W. COLBY, Commanding Nebraska State Troops.
    SIR:--In answer to your inquiry of a recent date, I would state that in my opinion to no one cause can be attributed the recent so called outbreak on the part of the Sioux, but rather to a combination of causes gradually cumulative in their effect and dating back through many years, in fact to the inauguration of our practically demonstrated faulty Indian policy.
   There can be no question but that many of the treaties, agreements, or solemn promises made by our Government with these Indians have been broken.
   Many of them have been kept by us technically, but as far as the Indian is concerned have been misunderstood by him through a lack of proper explanation at time of signing, and hence considered by him as broken.

   It must also be remembered that in all of the treaties made by the Government with the Indians a large portion of them have not agreed to, or signed the same. Noticeably was this so in the agreement secured by us with them the summer before last,. by which we secured one-half of the remainder of the Sioux reserve, amounting to about 16,000 square miles. This agreement barely carried with the Sioux nation as a whole, but did not carry at Pine Ridge or Rosebud, where the strong majority were against it; and it must be noted that wherever there was the strongest opposition manifested to the recent treaty, there, during the present trouble, has been found the elements opposed to the Government.
   The Sioux nation, which at one time, with the confederated bands of Cheyennes and Arapahoes, controlled a region of country bounded on the North by the Yellowstone, on the south by the Arkansas, and reaching from the Missouri River to the Rocky Mountains, has seen this large domain under the various treaties dwindle down to their now limited reserve of less than 16,000 square miles; and with the land has disappeared the buffalo and other game; the memory of this, chargeable by them to the white man, necessarily irritates them. There is back of all this the natural race antagonism which our dealings with the aborigine in connection with the inevitable onward march of civilization has in no degree lessened.
   It has been our experience, and the experience of other nations that defeat in war is soon, not sooner or later, forgotten by the coming generation, and as a result we have a tendency to a constant recurrence of outbreak on the part of the weaker race.
   It is now sixteen years since our last war with the Sioux in 1876, a time when our present Sioux warriors were mostly children and therefore have no memory of having felt the power of the Government; it is but natural that these young warriors lacking in experience should require but little incentive to induce them to test the bravery of the white man on the war path, where the traditions of his people teach him is the only path to glory and a chosen seat in the "Happy Hunting Grounds."
   For these reasons every precaution should be adopted by the Government to guard against trouble with its disastrous results. Have such precautions been adopted? Investigation of the present trouble does not so indicate.
   13

   Sitting Bull and other irreconcilable relics of the campaign of 1876 were allowed to remain among their people and foment discord.
   The staple articles of food at Pine Ridge and some of the other agencies had been out down below the subsisting point, noticeably the beef at Pine Ridge, which from an annual treaty allowance of 6,250,000 lbs., gross was cut down to 4,000,000 lbs. The contract on that beef was violated in-so-much as that contract called for Northern ranch beef, for which was substituted through beef from Texas, with an unparalleled resulting shrinkage in winter, so that the Indians did not actually receive half ration of this food in winter, the very time the largest allowance of food is required.
   By the fortunes of political war, weak agents were placed in charge of some of the agencies at the very time that trouble was known to be brewing.
   Noticeably was this so at Pine Ridge, where a notoriously weak and unfit man was placed in charge. His flight, abandonment of his agency and his call for troops have, with the horrible results of the same, become facts in history.
   Now as for facts in connection with Pine Ridge, which agency has unfortunately become the theater of the present "war;" was there necessity for troops? My past experience with those Indians does not so indicate.
   For seven long years, from 1879 to 1886, I as agent managed this agency without the presence of a soldier on the reservation, and none nearer than sixty miles, and in those times the Indians were naturally much wilder than they are to-day.
   To be sure during the seven years we occasionally had exciting times, when the only thing lacking to cause an outbreak was the calling for troops by the agent, and the presence of the same.
   As a matter of fact, however, no matter how much disturbed affairs were, no matter bow imminent an outbreak, the progressive chiefs with their following came to the front, enough in the majority with the fifty Indian policemen, to at once crush out all attempts at rebellion against the authority of the agent and the Government.
   Why was this? Because in those times we believed in placing confidence in the Indians; in establishing, as far as possible, a home rule government on the reservation. We established local courts presided over by the Indians with Indian juries; in fact we believed in having the Indians assist in working out their own salvation.

   We courted and secured the friendship and support of the progressive and orderly element, as against the mob element.
   Whether the system thus inaugurated was practicable, was successful, comparison with recent events will decide.
   When my Democratic successor took charge in 1886, he deemed it necessary to make general changes in the system at Pine Ridge, i. e.: a Republican system, all white men, half breeds or Indians who had sustained the agent under the former administration, were classed as Republicans and had to go. The progressive chiefs, such as Young-Man-Afraid, Little Wound and White Bird, were ignored, and the backing of the element of order and progress was alienated from the agent and the Government, and in the place of this strong backing that had maintained order for seven years, was substituted Red Cloud and other non-progressive chiefs, sustainers of the ancient tribal system.
   If my successor had been other than an amateur, or had had any knowledge or experience in the inside Indian politics of an Indian tribe, he would have known that if the element he was endeavoring to relegate to the rear had not been the balance of power, I could not for seven years have held out against the mob element which he now sought to put in power.
   In other words, he unwittingly threw the balance of power at Pine Ridge against the government, as be later on discovered to his cost. When still later he endeavored to maintain order and suppress the "Ghost Dance," the attempt resulted in a most dismal failure.
   The Democratic agent was succeeded in October last by the recently removed Republican agent, a gentleman totally ignorant of Indians and their peculiarities; a gentleman with not a qualification in his make-up calculated to fit him for the position of agent at one of the largest and most difficult agencies in the service to manage; a man selected solely as a reward for political services. He might have possibly been an average success as an Indian Agent at a small, well regulated agency.
   He endeavored to strengthen up matters, but the chiefs and leaders who could have assisted him in so doing had been alienated by the former agent; they virtually said among themselves: "We after incurring the enmity of the bad element among our people by sustaining the Government, have been ignored and ill-treated by that