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THE PROMULGATION OF THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
(1862)
BY FRANCIS C. CARPENTER1
The appointed hour found me at the well-remembered door of the official chamber—that door watched daily, with so many conflicting emotions of hope and fear, by the anxious throng regularly gathered there. The President had preceded me, and was already deep in Acts of Congress, with which the writing-desk was strewed, awaiting his signature. He received me pleasantly, giving me a seat near his own armchair; and after having read Mr. Lovejoy's note,2 he took off his spectacles, and said, "Well, Mr. C——, we will turn you in loose here, and try to give you a good chance to work out your idea." Then, without paying much attention to the enthusiastic expression of my ambitious desire and purpose, he proceeded to give me a detailed account of the history and issue of the great proclamation.
"It had got to be," said he, "midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game! I now determined upon the adoption of the emancipation policy; and, without consultation with, or the knowledge of the Cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called a Cabinet meeting upon the subject. This was the last of July, or the first part of the month of August, 1862." (The exact date he did not remember.) "This Cabinet meeting took place, I think, upon a Saturday. All were present, excepting Mr. Blair, the Postmaster-General, who was absent at the opening of the discussion, but came in subsequently. I said to the Cabinet that I had resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice, but to lay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them; suggestions as to which would be in order, after they had heard it read.
"Mr. Lovejoy," said he, "was in error when he informed you that it excited no comment, excepting on the part of Secretary Seward. Various suggestions were offered. Secretary Chase wished the language stronger in reference to the arming of the blacks. Mr. Blair, after he came in, deprecated the policy on the ground that it would cost the Administration the fall elections. Nothing, however, was offered that I had not already fully anticipated and settled in my own mind, until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance: 'Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government.' His idea," said the President, "was that it would be considered our last shriek, on the retreat." (This was his precise expression.) "'Now,' continued Mr. Seward, 'while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue, until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war!'"
Mr. Lincoln continued: "The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the subject, I had entirely overlooked. The result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for a victory. From time to time I added or changed a line, touching it up here and there, anxiously watching the progress of events. Well, the next news we had was of Pope's disaster, at Bull Run. Things looked darker than ever. Finally, came the week of the Battle of Antietam.3 I determined to wait no longer. The news, came, I think, on Wednesday, that the advantage was on our side. I was then staying at the Soldiers' Home (three miles out of Washington). Here I finished writing the second draft of the preliminary proclamation; came up on Saturday; called the Cabinet together to hear it, and it was published the following Monday."
At the final meeting of September 20th, another interesting incident occurred in connection with Secretary Seward. The President had written the important part of the proclamation in these words:
"That, on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize the freedom of such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom." "When I finished reading this paragraph," resumed Mr. Lincoln, "Mr. Seward stopt me, and said, 'I think, Mr. President, that you should insert after the word "recognize," in that sentence, the words "and maintain."' I replied that I had already fully considered the import of that expression in this connection, but I had not introduced it, because it was not my way to promise what I was not entirely sure that I could perform, and I was not prepared to say that I thought we were exactly able to 'maintain' this.
"But," said he, "Seward insisted that we ought to take this ground; and the words finally went in!"
"It is a somewhat remarkable fact," he subsequently remarked, "that there were just one hundred days between the dates of the two proclamations issued upon the 22d of September and the 1st of January. I had not made the calculation at the time."
Having concluded this interesting statement, the President then proceeded to show me the various positions occupied by himself and the different members of the Cabinet, on the occasion of the first meeting. "As nearly as I remember," said he, "I sat near the head of the table; the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War were here, at my right hand; the others were grouped at the left."
1 From Carpenter's "Six Months in the White House with Abraham Lincoln." The author was a portrait painter of considerable reputation in his time. His picture of the "Signing of the Emancipation Proclamation" is one of the most widely familiar American historical paintings. While making sketches for this picture Carpenter came into personal relations with the President and with members of his Cabinet, whom he saw with frequency.
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2 A note of introduction to Lincoln.
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3 The second battle of Bull Run was fought on August 29, 1862. Lee commanded the Confederates. Antietam was fought on September 17th of the same year.
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VICKSBURG, THE TURNING-POINT IN GRANT'S CAREER
THE "MONITOR" AND THE "MERRIMAC"
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© 2002, 2003 by Lynn Waterman
VICKSBURG, THE TURNING-POINT IN GRANT'S CAREER
(1863)
BY JOHN FORMBY1
To open the campaign against Vicksburg, Grant ordered the canal to be enlarged which had been cut the year before, but when he came, he saw that this would be useless, as the enemy had established a battery which enfiladed it. He then tried to turn the position by the bayou of the Yazoo and its tributaries, but the distances were great, the work slow, and the Confederates forestalled and defeated all his attempts. He spent February and March in vain endeavors to turn tho right flank of the defenses, and then had to devise something else; but what? There seemed a choice of three plans: (1) to assault the batteries; (2) to go back to Memphis and start afresh, along the Mississippi Central Railway; (3) to move around opposite Vicksburg, cross the river below it on to the high land, and attack it in rear. The first would almost certainly be defeated. From a military point of view the second was best, but Grant chose the third, tho it was most risky, and even the supplies depended on success, because if successful it would be decisive, and political considerations forbade even the semblance of retreat.
The war was at a standstill, generally, and many clamored for his removal from command. It was the turning-point of his career. The detail of the plan was to move down the bayous to the west of the river to New Carthage, some thirty miles below Vicksburg, run the gunboats and transports past the batteries, make a combined attack on Grand Gulf, and bring the army over; then to move along the valley of the Big Black, and attack the land side of Vicksburg. The original plan appears to have been for Banks to cooperate from the South, but this was nullified by the unexpected strength of Port Hudson.
The Confederate line was very long, there being several outlying works such as Fort Pemberton, up the Yazoo to the north, but the main line began at Haines' Bluff, a detached position north of the town, and ran with intervals to Grand Gulf, thirty miles away by land, sixty by water. To Port Hudson, also in Pemberton's command, the line was two hundred miles long, and was held by about 50,000 effective men. The latter position was quite new, for the Confederates, after Sherman's attack at Chickasaw Bluffs, had recognized that the Union army meant business, that they could not form a flotilla to oppose Porter's, so that the river must be held by land works, and the fortifications of Port Hudson, just began, were pushed forward in all haste in January. Fort Pemberton and Grand Gulf were the outworks of the main line; to the north stretched the Yazoo watershed, a district of swamp, tangled forest, and bayou, from where the high land receded from the Mississippi, 180 miles away, to where they met again at Vicksburg, each curving outward till there was a breadth of some fifty miles between them in the center. Fort Pemberton was in the middle of this almost impenetrable tangle, through which Grant vainly tried to force his way.
The river front of the Vicksburg fortifications was three miles long, and the works were carried around in rear at a distance of about two miles from the town. Some nine miles back from the Mississippi ran the Big Black River, coming out by Grand Gulf, thirty miles below. There were also strong works at Warrenton on the Mississippi, a few miles south of Vicksburg. The garrison was commanded by Stevenson, the district by Pemberton. From Vicksburg a railway ran eastward, connecting it with two important lines, the New Orleans and Memphis, and the Mobile and Ohio, at Jackson and Meridian, respectively. A relieving force was being assembled to the northeast, but Johnston, the Confederate commander from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, was at this time at Tullahoma with Bragg.
On the Union side, McClernand's corps moved on March 28th, and reached New Carthage on April 20th, the gunboats passing the batteries on the 16th. The ground was swampy and the work of moving the army very slow, but all were ready by the 29th, opposite Grand Gulf. On that day Grant tried to cover the crossing with the fleet, but the gunboats were very roughly handled, and could not stand the plunging fire from the high batteries, and he saw that the place must be taken by the army. Next day the fleet bombarded the place, and McClernand's corps crossed; Sherman was sent to make a demonstration at Haines' Bluff to cover this operation, and handled his force so well that Pemberton thought that the real attack was there, and recalled the reenforcements which he had sent to Grand Gulf, which insured Grant's success, but Bowen, commanding at Grand Gulf, made such a gallant defense against overwhelming numbers that the fighting was very severe before McClernand made good his footing on the high ground. Sherman rejoined the army on May 7th. At this critical time Grant had the good luck to be cut off from Washington, for Halleck ordered him to join Banks further south, which would have killed his plan. This order was delivered to him when he was driving Bowen before him, but he could then disregard it, owing to the changed circumstances. He made his base at Grand Gulf for the new campaign.
When Grant was withdrawing his army from the north side, Pemberton reported that he was retreating, and was ordered to send to Bragg all the troops that he could spare, which he did before he found out his mistake: he was only able to get a few of them back, and especially missed Van Dorn's cavalry, for he had to use infantry to do their work in trying to stop Grierson. Grierson's raid was one of the most successful of the war. He left La Grange on April 17th with about 1,700 men, but detached a regiment and went on with 1,000, marched 600 miles in sixteen days through the State of Mississippi, destroyed some fifty miles of railway, and inflicted more loss than he suffered, distracting the enemy's attention at a most critical time. He rode into Baton Rouge on May 2d. This was almost the only successful raid carried out in an enemy's country, but it passed from one secure base to another, avoiding the great danger of return.
Pemberton's army was overextended and weak in the center, stretching from near Vicksburg to Jackson, forty miles away, when Grant got a footing to the south; he was told to concentrate, but thinking that Grant would have to retire from want of supplies, did not do so. Johnston came down with a small force, but tho he had been ordered to go and take command of the army outside Vicksburg, did not do so, but told Pemberton to come and join him. Grant was too quick for them; he struck and broke Pemberton's center at Champion's Hill, and then drove off the force at Jackson; he next turned on Johnston and drove him away also. Johnston's plan was to fight a decisive battle for Vicksburg in the field, not to shut up a large force there, which must fall with the place, and whose strength, added to the field army, would do more to secure it. Pemberton, on the other hand, did not want to uncover Vicksburg, as being the key of the Mississippi, and also an enormous depot; further, it was the Southern policy to gain time, either for foreign recognition, or to tire the North out. This plan, however, had no real chance of attaining its objects; Johnston's was the true view, but he was by no means the man to carry it out. Pemberton then went south to cut Grant's communications, which did not then exist, and the Confederate commanders were at cross-purposes; they had about as many men as Grant, 40,000, but divided, with his army between them.
Grant having thus prevented the junction of the Confederate generals, and driven their troops apart, thought best to strike while the iron was hot and take Vicksburg by storm; he surrounded it, making connection with the fleet on both flanks, on the 18th, and made an unsuccessful assault next day. He then set to work to make good roads to the Yazoo for his right flank, and was very anxious to take the place before Johnston's new army, which was concentrating at Canton, could interfere; but Grierson's destruction of railways had hindered this very much. Grant also sent for all possible reenforcements, and was so promptly answered that Johnston's chance was soon gone. After the failure of the 19th, Grant carefully reconnoitered Vicksburg, and tried again on the 22d; he was checked, but McClernand's men got into a redoubt, and he reported to Grant that if the other corps would now do their part, the place was theirs. They therefore attacked again, only to make bad worse, for before they did so, the redoubt had been retaken, and McClernand's men made prisoners; the result was a heavy defeat. McClernand published a most offensive congratulatory order to his command, claiming that they had taken the place, but that the others had failed them, which was absolutely untrue. Grant, therefore, removed him from his command and gave it to General Ord.
Pemberton, when his troops had been defeated outside the town, retired within its lines, abandoning the outlying works. Vicksburg lies on a line of bluffs rising from the river, and deeply seamed by ravines, a position very favorable for defense, but the best line was too long for his force of less than 30,000 men, and tho it was well fortified with many guns, the proportion of heavy ones was too small. Grant, finding that the place could not be rushed, invested it, for Pemberton had to feed the population as well as his own men, so could not hold out long, tho Johnston, whose army was now said to be 30,000 strong, might raise the siege.
To cover it, therefore, he took the Ninth Corps, which had just come, and a division from each of the others, and put them under Sherman in the middle of June. Sherman took a position from the Benton Road, east of Haines' Bluff, along the valley of the Big Black to the railway crossing, and fortified it carefully, holding Johnston in check till Pemberton, who had been waiting in his trenches, for forty-seven days, gave up in despair, and surrendered on July 4th. Johnston was always suggesting plans but did not strike. Twenty-four thousand, four hundred and ninety-one men were surrendered, 172 guns, 60,000 small arms, and a great quantity of ammunition. Grant began with 43,000 men, and ended with 75,000; his losses were 9,362, including 453 missing. Pemberton's greatest force just before the siege was 40,000; when he moved into the town it was only 28,000. His losses were probably about 10,000, but the campaign cost the Confederates the Mississippi and the States to the west. This was the first campaign in the war in which the newly raised colored troops were regularly used, both with the main army and to guard the country in rear, tho a few were with Banks at Port Hudson in May.
1 From Formby's "American Civil War." By permission of the publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons.
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"STONEWALL" JACKSON'S DEATH
THE PROMULGATION OF THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
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